Chicago-Kent College of Law

Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law
125th Anniversary Materials

125th Anniversary

2-23-2013

The Changing Composition of the American Jury
Nancy S. Marder
Chicago-Kent College of Law, nmarder@kentlaw.iit.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/docs_125
Part of the Legal Commons, Legal Education Commons, and the Legal History Commons

Recommended Citation
Marder, Nancy S., "The Changing Composition of the American Jury" (2013). 125th Anniversary Materials.
5.
https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/docs_125/5

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the 125th Anniversary at Scholarly Commons @ IIT
Chicago-Kent College of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in 125th Anniversary Materials by an authorized
administrator of Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law. For more information, please contact
jwenger@kentlaw.iit.edu, ebarney@kentlaw.iit.edu.

66

Then & Now: Stories of Law and Progress

“First woman jury, Los Angeles,” photo by Bain News Service, 1911, Bain Collection, Library of Congress.

THE CHANGING COMPOSITION
OF THE AMERICAN JURY
Nancy S. Marder

W

hen IIT Chicago-Kent
College of Law was
founded 125 years ago,
many of our key legal institutions,
such as the jury, were well established. By 1888, the year of our
school’s founding, the jury was seen
as an institution that provided justice in a nation created by a revolution of “we the people.” Although
it no longer seems remarkable to us
today, the jury system gave ordinary
citizens, untutored in the law, the
power to decide cases and to dispense justice.
Today, reinforced by movies,
television shows, and constant media coverage, the American people

have two deeply-held views about
the jury. The first is that the jury is
meant to represent all of us—“we
the people”—by reflecting our diversity as much as is practical. In
every high-profile jury case, much
attention is paid to the diversity of
the jury. In particular, we care about
race and gender more than almost
any other characteristics. Although
the diversity of the venire is enshrined in several Supreme Court
cases, the diversity of the petit jury
is reinforced by the portrayal of the
jury in popular culture.
The second widely-held view is
that the jury has one job, and that is
to determine the facts. Although a
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jury trial is presided over by a judge
and involves decision-making about
the law, the jury ostensibly plays no
role in determining which laws apply or what standards should be met.
This arrangement seems sensible because the judge and lawyers bring to
the trial legal expertise that the jurors do not have.
While these two views are well
accepted, the students in our first
law class in 1888 would be shocked
to learn what our first-year students
now take for granted. Though our
modern impulse is to assume that
a jury should reflect the diversity
of our community, at one time that
diversity was limited to white men
of property. Our broader understanding of diversity has been the
result of a hard-fought struggle to
extend the rights of jury service to
African-American men and later
to women. This expansion of jury
rights, however, has not been continuous; rather, it has proceeded in fits
and starts. In fact, African-American men in some states in the South
were given the right to serve as jurors
during Reconstruction only to have
that right stripped away by the end
of the 1800s before being restored
decades later. So, too, with women
in the Western territories; they had
the right to serve as jurors in the late
1800s, but it was short-lived.
It will also surprise the modern
reader to discover that the role of the
jury was initially to decide both the
law and the facts. The diminution of
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the role of the jury, so that it decided
only the facts, happened gradually
from about 1850 to the 1930s. Some
researchers believe that as the practice of law became more professional, the distinction widened between
judges and lawyers who knew the
law and ordinary citizens who did
not, until it made little sense for jurors to decide the law.
I offer a more radical theory in
which I see a connection between
the growing diversity of the jury and
the declining power of the jury. My
theory is that the white, male legal
establishment began to curtail the
power of the jury as African-American men and women had the right
to serve on juries. Although African-American men and women lost
that right by the late 1800s, they regained it, albeit after much struggle,
many decades later. For both groups,
however, even when official barriers
were eliminated, other practices kept
them from actually being seated on
juries. Some of these practices, such
as the peremptory challenge, are still
used today in a discriminatory manner, in spite of Supreme Court cases
to the contrary, in an effort to keep
African-American men and women
from being seated on juries.
The Exclusion of African-American
Men from the Jury

A

lbert Alschuler and Andrew
Deiss, in an article entitled A
Brief History of the Criminal Jury in
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the United States, identified 1860 as
the year in which African-American
men first served on a jury. In that
year, two African-American men sat
on a jury in Worcester, Massachusetts. In 1864, Congress passed legislation that allowed African-American men to testify in federal courts,
and this was followed by legislation
that allowed them to testify in state
courts. Jury service was soon to follow.
During Reconstruction (1863–
1877), African-American men served
on juries in some states. For example,
in South Carolina in 1869, the legislature mandated not only the integration of grand and petit juries,
but also that the racial composition
of the jury should approximate that
of the community. Similarly, in New
Orleans between 1872 and 1878,
one-third of the citizens summoned
for jury duty were African-Americans, and this percentage matched
their representation in Orleans
Parish. Between 1870 and 1884 in
Washington County, Texas, where
African-Americans were approximately 50 percent of the population,
they constituted about 30 percent of
those who served on juries. During
the 1870s, in Warren County, Mississippi, African-Americans were
about 35 percent of the grand jurors,
and even though that percentage did
not approximate their percentage in
the community (where they were 70
percent of the community), it was a
significant improvement over their

total exclusion in the past.
Newspapers, in their reporting of
jury trials during this period, noted
when an African-American man
(and they were only men) served as
a juror. On January 15, 1884, in the
Chicago Daily Tribune, one story
questioned whether South Carolina
jurors in a particular case had voted to convict based on their political
parties; it included the following observation: “Three of the jurors, one
a negro and two white men, refused
to find a verdict of guilty.” On February 16, 1885, in the Chicago Daily
Tribune, a story described a murder
trial in New Orleans and mentioned
the sole African-American juror on
this jury: “The only juror who stood
out from the very beginning in favor of conviction was one Edwards,
a negro, and the only negro on the
jury, and he maintained his manly
and honest position to the end, notwithstanding that [the defendant’s]
friends went to his house while he
was serving and threatened his family with violence.”
The newspaper accounts also
noted when the African-American
juror was the first African-American to serve in that locale. A brief
story on May 6, 1891, in the New
York Times announced that a man
named Nelson Stark, described as
“colored,” had been selected as the
eleventh juror in the Garrison murder trial. The story noted that “[it] is
the first time in the history of that
county [in West Virginia] that a col-
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“Negroes as Jurors,” New York Times headline, Nov. 3, 1885.

ored man has sat on an important
case in the State court.” Similarly,
on September 7, 1880, the Chicago
Daily Tribune noted that “[f]or the
first time in the history of Kentucky
the panel of jurymen for the duty
in a criminal court included in the
list of the Louisville Circuit Court
to-day three colored men.” Two of
those men were selected to serve on
a grand jury and the third man was
selected for a petit jury. The article
noted that there were a number of
African-Americans at court that day
and “they evidently took great satisfaction in seeing representatives of
their race assume privileges heretofore denied them.”
The inclusion of African-American men on the jury was not limited
to Southern states. A notice in the
New York Times on November 19,
1890, announced that “[a]mong the
jurors in a case in the Circuit Court
this morning was Abe Peterson, a
Grafton blacksmith, who is the first
colored man to sit on a jury in Renssalaer County[, New York].” On July
9, 1893, a lengthy story in the Chicago Daily Tribune reported that for

the first time in Madison, Wisconsin, an all-African-American jury
(six jurors) heard a civil case involving an assault and battery; the article noted that this jury marked “an
inauguration of a new judicial era.”
Newspaper accounts of jury trials also reported on perceived differences between white jurors and
African-American jurors. According to one story in the Chicago Daily
Tribune on July 10, 1880, “[t]he first
negro juror in Atlanta, the other day,
promptly joined in convicting a negro who was put on trial.” As a result
of African-Americans’ seeming proclivity to convict, “[t]he next prisoner, also a negro, objected to having
one of his own race on the jury.”
Another story, published in the New
York Times on November 3, 1885,
also observed that African-American jurors had been “decidedly
in favor of the Commonwealth as
against colored offenders.” The article suggested that African-American
jurors wanted to show that they were
committed to law and order—so
much so that older lawyers who had
African-American clients would not
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select African-American jurors because “they claim[ed] that colored
jurors are more severe in meting
out punishment to offenders of their
race.”
In spite of constitutional protections provided by the Fourteenth
Amendment (1868) and the Fifteenth
Amendment (1870), statutory protections provided by the Ku Klux Klan
Act of 1871, the Federal Civil Rights
Act of 1875, and the Federal Jury
Selection Act
of 1879, and a
U.S. Supreme
Court case,
Strauder
v.
West Virginia,
100 U.S. 303
(1880), which
held that a state
statute
disqualifying African-American men
from jury service was unconstitutional, African-American men lost
their place on juries in the South
in the 1890s. Booker T. Washington observed at the end of the
nineteenth century: “In the whole
of Georgia & Alabama, and other
Southern states not a negro juror is
allowed to sit in the jury box in state
courts.” According to a 1910 study,
African-Americans rarely served on
juries in Florida, Louisiana, Mississippi, Missouri, South Carolina, and
Virginia, and they never served on
juries in Alabama and Georgia. In
“Jury of Whites and Blacks,” illustration by James E.
Taylor, 1867, Library of Congress.

sum, according to another commentator, Douglas Colbert, “[a]lthough
it was common for blacks to have
served as jurors during Reconstruction, they virtually disappeared from
the southern jury box by 1900, even
in counties where they constituted
an overwhelming majority of the local population.”
Even though statutes could no
longer prohibit African-American
men from serving on the jury after
Strauder, other
practices kept
them from the
jury box. James
Forman, in Juries and Race
in the Nineteenth Century,
described the
violence directed toward African-Americans
and white Republicans that kept
African-American men in the South
from serving as jurors or witnesses,
or seeking or being afforded the protection of the legal system. All-white
Southern juries failed to convict the
white perpetrators of these crimes.
Non-violent and more subtle
practices also kept African-Americans from actually being seated on
a jury, even if they had been summoned to serve. These practices
ranged from color-coding by race
the names placed in the wheel from
which jurors were selected to the
discretion exercised by white jury
commissioners in selecting only
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white men whom they knew to serve
as jurors. Mississippi’s 1892 law,
which allowed three state officials to
select jurors based on their “good intelligence, sound judgment, and fair
character,” was another way to keep
African-Americans off the jury; other Southern states followed suit.
The practice of discriminatory
peremptory challenges, which continues to this day, was another way
to keep African-Americans from
being selected for petit juries. Each
party could exercise a certain number of peremptories and use them
to remove prospective jurors without giving any reason at all. Parties
used their peremptory challenges to
remove African-Americans from the
jury. Prosecutors, in particular, exercised race-based peremptories to remove African-Americans from the
jury in criminal cases in which the
defendant was African-American.
Even after a number of cases, from
the mid-1960s to the mid-1990s, in
which the Supreme Court developed
an elaborate framework to attempt
to counter the exercise of race-based
peremptory challenges, the practice
continues today. Lawyers have simply learned ways to avoid discovery.
In some courts in the South, defense
lawyers in capital cases will not even
challenge the prosecutor’s use of a
race-based peremptory because they
know the judge will never find a peremptory to be discriminatory. The
practice of exercising discriminatory
peremptory challenges persists, even
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though it is undertaken in more subtle ways than it once was.
The Exclusion of Women from the Jury

W

omen’s experience in serving as jurors tracked African-American men’s experience in
some ways, but lagged behind by
many years. Before 1888, women in
at least two Western territories were
permitted to serve as jurors, and in
1898 women in Utah were permitted
to serve as jurors. Wyoming Territory gave women the right to vote and
to sit on juries in 1869, with the first
woman sitting on a jury in Laramie,
Wyoming in 1871. However, there is
some dispute as to when Wyoming
women lost their right to sit on juries. Albert Alschuler and Andrew
Deiss point to 1872 as the year that
“Wyoming’s experiment in equality
in the courtroom” came to an end,
and a New York Times article on November 19, 1883, claimed that “no
woman [in Wyoming] is ever seen
nowadays in the jury box.” However, in an article in the Chicago Daily
Tribune on October 26, 1891, the
first Governor of the State of Wyoming was interviewed and said that
there had been “several women jurors in the courts of Cheyenne, the
Capital of Wyoming.” The Wyoming
Almanac of Politics included an article from the Cheyenne Daily Leader,
dated September 17, 1891, describing a trial in which the defendant
was female as were two of the jurors.
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In 1884, women in Washington Territory had the right to vote and to
serve on juries. However, in 1887,
after a change in personnel on the
Supreme Court of Washington Territory, women lost their right to sit on
juries. In 1898, Utah allowed women
to serve as jurors, and has traditionally been credited as the first state to
do so, though women rarely served
as jurors until the 1930s.
Although there were few women serving as jurors in the 1880s,
there were occasional ruminations
about what women jurors would be
like and what difference they would
make on juries. In a brief note in
the Chicago Daily Tribune on April
21, 1888, entitled Call for Feminine
Jurors, the writer suggested that it is
difficult to convict a female defendant on the West Coast, and perhaps
if women were permitted to serve as
jurors this situation would change.
The writer offered the following recommendation: “It would be a good
thing if the rights of women could
be so extended that in cases where
a woman is accused of crime she
might be tried by a jury of her own
sex.” On June 28, 1893, there was a
brief article in the Chicago Daily
Tribune entitled Women as Jurors,
which raised the question whether Lizzie Borden should have been
tried by a jury that included women
because “a woman on trial for her
life should have the right to demand
an equal representation of women
on the jury.” However, the same ar-

ticle also suggested that whenever
the defendant is a woman, “there
are few men not predisposed to regard the opposite sex with tender
consideration.” In 1893, the Senate
Judiciary Committee held a hearing
to consider a bill that would allow
women to serve as jurors if they “are
wives of men who are duly qualified
so to act,” according to an article in
the New York Times on February 1,
1893. The article reported that Dr.
Mary Walker spoke in support of the
bill, but the bill did not go forward.
Women thought the passage
of the Nineteenth Amendment in
1920, which gave them the right to
vote, would also give them the right
to serve on juries, but this proved
not to be the case in most states. According to Professor Gretchen Ritter,
around the time of the Nineteenth
Amendment, 14 states granted women the right to serve on the jury. In
seven of these states, new laws were
passed that gave women the right to
serve. In the other seven states, jury-qualification statutes described
jurors as “electors,” so once women
became electors under the Nineteenth Amendment, they automatically became eligible to serve as
jurors. However, other states, like
Illinois, rejected this idea. The Illinois Supreme Court reasoned that
at the time when the Illinois General
Assembly used the term “electors”
only men could be electors. If women were to be included as “electors,”
then it was up to the Illinois General
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Assembly to say so, which it did,
though not until 1939.
States decided whether to allow
women to serve on juries in their
own courts, and the federal courts
followed the practice of the state in
which the federal court was located.
It was not until the Civil Rights Act
of 1957 that federal courts allowed
women to serve as jurors in federal courts regardless of the practice
of that state’s courts. State courts,
even when they ostensibly permitted
women to serve as jurors, followed
practices that kept many women
from actually serving. In some states,
women had automatic exemptions
from jury duty. In other states, such
as Florida and Louisiana, women
could serve as jurors, but only if they
went down to the courthouse and
affirmatively registered for service,
which was an extra step that men
did not have to take. States that adhered to this practice claimed that it
respected women’s role in the home
and that most women would be unable to serve because of their duties
at home. The effect of affirmative
registration was that very few women registered for jury service. As late
as 1961, this practice was upheld in
Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57 (1961),
and was not found to be unconstitutional until Taylor v. Louisiana, 419
U.S. 522, 533 (1975).
Even after the demise of affirmative registration, the exercise of
peremptory challenges was another
way to keep women from serving
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as jurors. Although women were
summoned to serve, they could be
struck from the petit jury by lawyers
exercising gender-based peremptory
challenges. Whereas race-based peremptory challenges were addressed
by the Supreme Court in a series of
cases spanning from the mid-1960s
to the mid-1990s, this line of cases
did not become applicable to gender until J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel.
T.B., 511 U.S. 127 (1994). Although
there are many reasons that lawyers
defend the peremptory challenge—
from giving defendants control over
jury selection to ridding the jury
of an outlier who could not be dismissed for cause—the peremptory
challenge also should be seen as a
practice that has been, and continues to be, used to keep women and
African-Americans from serving on
juries.
A Decline in Jury Power

B

ack in 1888, when African-American men had for all
intents and purposes lost their right
to serve on juries and the few women in Western territories still had
their short-lived right to serve on
juries, the jury had begun to experience a decline in power. Whereas the
jury—from colonial times until the
1850s—had always had the power to
decide the law and the facts, the jury
started to lose its power to decide
the law and was reduced to deciding
only the facts. This loss came about
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through state court interpretations
of state statutes and constitutions.
This loss could be seen in a number
of states, including Massachusetts
in 1855 and Louisiana in 1871, and
soon spread to other states, including Georgia in 1879 and Vermont in
1892. Today, only two states, Indiana
and Maryland, still instruct jurors
that they have the right to determine
the law as well as the facts. Although
these two states’ constitutions provide for this right, the judiciary in
both states has narrowed this right
through case law.
My own theory is that as African-American men and women
sought to serve on juries, there was
a move on the part of judges to limit
the power of juries. Some commentators suggest that this move came
about because of the growing professionalization of judges. As judges received legal training and saw
themselves as professionals, they
began to see the functions of judges
and juries as distinct, and attempted to limit juries to the fact-finding
function only. Another possibility is
that as the law grew more complex, it
seemed appropriate for professionals
with training and knowledge to decide it, rather than citizens who had
only common sense and experience
to guide them. My own theory is that
the move to limit the function of the
jury to fact-finding came about at a
time when outsiders—women and
African-Americans—were trying to
claim a right to serve as jurors. Al-

though African-American men and
women had not yet been able to secure their right to serve, the writing
was on the wall.
Thus, the late 1880s were a time
of transformation for the jury. Juries
in many states had lost their power
to decide the law, and were officially
limited to finding the facts. It is no
coincidence that this occurred at a
time when African-American men
and women had experienced the
right to serve as jurors, albeit briefly, and sought to recover that right,
even though it would take them
many years to do so. ◆
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